From MARCO PAVESI
Sir-I read with great interest Sander Greenland's article 1 and wish to make a few remarks regarding its central issues.
Greenland's distinction between deductions and inductions recalls the classical separation of scientific statements into analytical and synthetical judgements. In a formal logic system, the truth of a judgement depends only on the correct use of deductive tools of that particular system (the 'dictionary', as it is commonly labelled).
In empirical sciences, which are based on synthetical statements, syntactical tools must also be rigorous: in epidemiology, we need accurate definitions of risk or impact measurements. But this is not enough. We are also trying to say something about the real world, to make predictions. That is why empirical sciences, which are concerned (after Hume's definition) with the 'matters of fact', go beyond the domain of formal language and its logically necessary conclusions. In physics, as well as in epidemiology, deductive reasoning is no more sufficient, even if it is still necessary.
Since the 17th century scientific revolution, at least, the demarcation between analytical and synthetical judgements separates two different areas of science, each of them provided with its particular concept of truth. When David Hume affirmed that a statement like 'the sun will rise tomorrow' can by no means be demonstrated, 2 he meant that the decision concerning the truth of this prediction does not belong to logic, but to experience. As a consequence, unlike Popper, the Scottish philosopher would not conclude that 'induction does not exist', but that logic (absolute) truth does not exist in the domains of experience.
During the early decades of this century, the so-called 'logical empirism' developed the modern definition of a scientific theory as a structure in which two parts interact: (1i) A deductive system of symbols and definitions. (2i) An interpretation, i.e. a correspondence of part of the formal system and a group of empirical (observational) statements. The 'translation' is made possible by a rigorous rule manual.
As a consequence, Carnap, Reichenbach, Hempel and other logical positivists deduced that a theory is always testable as a whole by valuing its operativity or its predictive power. The translation of formal statements into empirical 'protocols', i.e. into predictions, is precisely what is labelled as induction and what makes a theory work as a scientific explanation of facts.
If I had to summarize Popper's criticism against inductivism, I would choose two core points: (1P) Induction leads to indecidibility. No collection of observations can verify a theory.
(2P) Inductive method leads to a search for highly probable hypotheses, while what science needs is highly informative (and least probable) conjectures, i.e. highly testable and falsifiable hypotheses. Popper's conclusion is that the best result inductive rules can achieve is to support ad hoc hypotheses.
It appears clear that, while point (1P) reflects an epistemological problem which seems to have been solved by the replacement of the concept of 'verification' by that of 'testability' of a theory, point (2P) focuses on a methodological question. I will, therefore, examine each criticism separately, even if both refer to the same misunderstanding of the nature of the inductive method.
With respect to the first issue, my impression is that Popperian epidemiologists, following Popper, have in mind a simplistic idea of induction as a rule to reach certainty by proceeding from particular observations to general laws. Quite surprisingly, this point seems to be generally accepted and is not present at all in the current debate on inductive method: 3,4 a basic and 'semantic' article from McLure, 5 comparing refutationist and verificationist positions, defines inductivism by means of some core sentences like 'Certainty is possible', 'Observation reveals truth', 'Recognition of facts precedes formulation of theories' or 'Induction is the logical foundation of science'. No doubt Popper's criticisms to this position are successful: the point is that this is clearly not the definition of 'inductive method' given by logical positivism and which I have previously summarized. That induction leads to certainty, that it has a logical justification or that scientists develop theories by simply accumulating observations in their 'tabula rasa' minds are points of view which modern sciences definitively abandoned at the beginning of this century.
The methodological question (2P) concerns Popper's claim that scientific theories must be highly testable. It includes two aspects which appear very plausible and completely acceptable: a scientific theory must be rigorous, i.e. it must have a powerful formal system, and it must provide scientists with a relevant informative content, i.e. it must be able to explain new facts and predict them.
To Popper, however, 'testable' necessarily means 'falsifiable' -it cannot mean 'verifiable'-so his claim is that 'highly falsifiable theories' correspond to theories which are 'rich in empirical content'.
So far, this appears to be a strictly semantic question, and these lexical shifts could still be accepted. But Popper, and Popperians, come to conclusions which do not seem plausible in modern sciences. Given that the most highly informative theories are the least probable, because they explain many facts and make many falsifiable predictions, Popperians deduce that the most genuine scientific hypotheses are the most unlikely conjectures. Popper added 6 that hypotheses generating is absolutely 'free, neither justified nor justifiable'.
In my opinion, points (IP) and (2P) reflect semantic questions which, in epistemology as well as in the daily practice of LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 361 scientific research, are bound to lead to substantial and relevant consequences. From a scientist's point of view, it is straightforward to subscribe Popper's call for rigorous definitions and high predictive and explanatory power of theories, but it is hard to believe that Popper's ideas about hypothesis generating process and on the justification of new scientific conjectures may be accepted as viable rules for research practice. In fact, Popperian epidemiologists appear to follow Popper in his criticisms against the 'ingenuous' forms of induction (1P) and in his methodological claims (2P), but they do use some form of 'sophisticated' induction (as that summarized in (1i) and (2i)) in developing their epidemiological practice.
Applications of Popper's ideas in epidemiology-I can remember an interesting article by Weed 7 -generally involve an accurate justification of the study hypotheses as well as rigorous definitions of the predictions which are to be tested. The success of a hypothesis depends on the success of its predictions and, consequently, on the failure of falsification trials. The 'corroboration level' of each hypothesis is employed as a criterion of choice between competing hypotheses.
Beyond the replacement of 'inductive process' with 'falsificationism' and that of 'probability' with 'corroboration coefficient', I cannot see substantial differences with respect to the 'nonexisting' inductive method. Research is still aimed at developing a plausible (i.e. justifiable) hypothesis and at accepting it only after measuring and valuing its viability and its successful performances.
Popper's central ideas that the most genuinely scientific hypotheses, the most informative, must also be the least probable conjectures, and that their falsification is the objective of scientific research, 8 are clearly ignored. In practice, epidemiologists make use of all available data and information to accurately select the most useful hypotheses, i.e. the conjectures which are more likely to predict an outcome successfully.
In conclusion, I agree with Greenland that the debate about the existence and possibility of induction without doubt appears to be 'semantics' at the present state of epidemiological practice. However, semantic questions have dangerous consequences. In fact, the conceptual misunderstandings regarding the definition of inductive processes seem to lead Popper-influenced epidemiologists to reject induction from a theoretical point of view, while they commonly make use of it in practice. These scientists claim that induction does not exist, while what appears really questionable is the existence of any inductivist researcher whose ingenuity is comparable to that of Bertrand Russell's famous inductivist turkey. This is why epidemiology also needs an epistemological analysis of the inductive problem in order to ensure that no alternative to induction is available to scientific method.
From MANFRED WILDNER
Sir-This fundamental leading article 1 has to be commended, among others, for its 'useful semantics' by reviewing concepts of classical logic, which have the potential to contribute substantially to the consistency and scientific coherence of epidemiological research. Two basic modes of logical syllogisms are presented, modus ponens ('hypothetical syllogism') and modus tollens, and the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent is discussed in detail. The example given uses a logical relationship as first premise, e.g. H implies B, and statistical observations as second premise B, e.g. 'silicone implants are not significantly associated with scleroderma'. In this situation the assumed causal hypothesis H 'silicone implants do not cause scleroderma' is alleged to be an invalid conclusion drawn from the observation B. The key point is logical invalidity, ignoring biases and random errors. A logically valid conclusion would have been 'silicone implants cause scleroderma' (not H) given the observation 'silicone implants are significantly associated with scleroderma' (not B)-i.e. modus tollens. It should be noted that thereby empirical knowledge ('silicone implants are significantly associated with scleroderma') can be used to deduce logically a general rule ('silicone implants are significantly associated with scleroderma'). Another logically valid conclusion would have been 'silicone implants are not significantly associated with scleroderma', given the truth of hypothesis H-i.e. modus ponens (hypothetical syllogism). Although the observation may be correct that the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent is common in epidemiology, the conclusion B implies H may be not be fallacious in certain circumstances. These circumstances have been labelled Syllogism of Equivalence. 2 If the first premise is changed slightly to the logical relationship 'H implies B exactly', which is a bidirectional implication stating 'H implies B and B implies H', then the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent becomes a logically correct line of argument. Infectious disease epidemiology provides readily an example: let the first premise state B exactly if H, the second premise B 'AIDS is never present in the absence of the HIV virus' and the causal hypothesis H 'HIV virus is a necessary cause of AIDS'. This situation allows the logically valid conclusions
H implies B (modus ponens), not B implies not H (modus tollens) and B implies H (syllogism of equivalence!). This may appear as a rare
Bavarian Public Health Research Center, Tegernseer Landstr. 243 D-81549 Munich, Germany special case, but is in fact the usual situation for causal hypotheses regarding necessary causes. In summary, the deductive Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent depends on the assumed first premise, i.e. whether the logical implication is unidirectional or bidirectional (equivalent). This assumption is rarely made explicit in epidemiological studies. Its justification however goes beyond the discussion of logical implications.
Premature deaths and long-term mortality effects of air pollution
From PHILIPPE QUÉNEL, DENIS ZMIROU, WILLIAM DAB, ALAIN LE TERTRE AND SYLVIA MEDINA
Sir-McMichael et al. 1 state in their paper that inappropriate estimates of the annual number of deaths that could be avoided by reducing particles and sulphur dioxide air pollution have been calculated for Paris and Lyon in 1995 using results of time series analysis. 2 They also consider that we confused long-and short-term mortality related to ambient air pollution.
We think that McMichael et al.'s observations are mistaken and that these may be due to a misunderstanding of the French wording of the article. We agree that a distinction should be made between short-term and long-term health effects of air pollution and that, from a public health point of view, the priority is to prevent chronic effects. Close reading of our article reveals that this was also an important concern for us and we did not confuse long-term and short-term mortality. We repeatedly referred to daily deaths attributable to particles or sulphur dioxide pollution as premature deaths 2 (Tables 5 and 6 ) and we then discussed the issue of harvesting effect: at current levels, daily variations of air pollution are not liable to be a direct cause of mortality but bring forward deaths of people with preexisting cardiovascular or respiratory conditions by an amount of time that is not currently known (we referred to the same author as the one McMichael et al. cited 3 ). We support the authors' view on the need to develop new research on this matter. In the framework of the APHEA-2 project (Air Pollution and Health: a European Approach) that follows the APHEA-1 funded by EU 96-98 Climate Environmental Program, the issue of harvesting effect will be addressed.
We disagree with the authors when they consider that the impact of air pollution on mortality as estimated in time-series studies is exclusively an acute one. This impact is indeed a combination of acute as well as cumulative chronic effects. If air pollution does exert an influence on mortality and morbidity, which is not disputed by McMichael et al. this is the result of history of exposure and clinical effects (from a clinical point of view, only part of these so called 'acute' health conditions can be assumed completely reversible).
The key issue raised by McMichael et al. is the public health interpretation of mortality time-series studies. In relation to this issue, we want to stress four points: 1) Inappropriate use is often made of the term 'acute' instead of 'short term'. Acute refers to a toxicological classification of exposure where subjects are exposed during short periods (hours/ days) to a high amount of pollutant. Given the current low levels of exposure to air pollution in urban areas, short-term variation is the appropriate concept to be considered. 2) A distinction between the different causes of death must be made rather than combining all categories of mortality. While there is evidence that in the short term people with advanced chronic obstructive pulmonary disease are at risk of dying after increases of pollutant concentrations (perhaps within a few days), this remains to be shown for cardiovascular and other causes of mortality. [4] [5] [6] 3) Harvesting mortality effect has been observed following hot or cold spells but not related to ambient air pollution, even after the major episodes observed in the 1950s. 7 4) Assessing the public health significance of premature mortality related to ambient air pollution requires a set of criteria. Had a minimizing point of view prevailed in the 1950s, vital improvements in air pollution abatement policies would not have been achieved. We and others have observed that air pollution does have an impact on different mortality and morbidity indices at current levels which are often lower than today's European standards. How many attributable deaths within the susceptible population are acceptable without lowering these standards? This complex question is not solely a matter of scientific judgement but rather more a social issue. We believe that researchers are responsible for the validity of their results and have the duty to provide all information, but they do not have to take the role of public health decision makers.
